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Abstract—
Monitoring the activity on an IEEE 802.11 network is useful for
many applications, such as network management, optimizing deployment, or detecting network attacks. Deploying wireless sniffers
to monitor every access point in an enterprise network, however,
may be expensive or impractical. Moreover, some applications may
require the deployment of multiple sniffers to monitor the numerous channels in an 802.11 network. In this paper, we explore sampling strategies for monitoring multiple channels in 802.11b/g networks. We describe a simple sampling strategy, where each channel
is observed for an equal, predetermined length of time, and consider
applications where such a strategy might be appropriate. We then
introduce a sampling strategy that weights the time spent on each
channel according to the number of frames observed on that channel, and compare the two strategies under experimental conditions.

I. I NTRODUCTION
As IEEE 802.11 “Wi-Fi” networks become an integral
part of many enterprises and organizations, it becomes
increasingly important to monitor these networks for evidence of problems, attacks or breakdowns. With such networks being used for critical services such as VoWLAN
(Voice over Wireless Local Area Networks), any such
breakdown or attack could have a serious effect on an organization’s productivity.
Most WLAN measurement studies, e.g., [5], [15], [10],
have monitored the wired side of Access Points in an infrastructure WLAN using SNMP, syslog and packet sniffing. These techniques enable the monitoring of trafﬁc that
has been bridged from the wireless side to the wired side
of a network. They do not, however, allow us to gather
MAC layer data from the wireless side of the network,
data that might contain valuable information regarding
misbehavior or attacks. In particular, it is impossible to
detect wireless (layer 2) attacks, or problems that only affect the wireless side of the network.
To effectively troubleshoot a wireless network, it is
therefore necessary to monitor the wireless side of the
network as well. This can be achieved by deploying wireless “sniffers”: measurement devices with 802.11 radios
placed in “monitor” mode. Such radios will record every
802.11 frame that they hear.
Monitoring all of the trafﬁc on the wireless side of an
enterprise WLAN, however, can be expensive and difﬁcult to set up. Since each sniffer’s radio has a limited

range, one might require as many sniffers as access points
in the network. Additional sniffers might be required if
the purpose is to monitor areas that have bad coverage.
The cost of this large number of sniffers might be prohibitive.
Even if sufﬁcient sniffers are deployed, the spectrum
used for 802.11 networks is divided into several channels. For instance, 802.11b/g divides the 2.4GHz spectrum into 14 channels spaced 5MHz apart.1 Thus to monitor all of the potential 802.11b/g trafﬁc in the area of a
particular sniffer might require 14 different radios. Sniffers with multiple radios, such as the Porcupine from Indiana University [2] are large and may be difﬁcult to deploy on a large scale. Moreover, storing or transmitting
captured frames from 11 simultaneous channels may be
problematic, with each sniffer capable of capturing almost
600Mbps of trafﬁc (assuming 11 channels at maximum
802.11 link-layer rates).
Rather than deploy multiple-radio sniffers, it might be
more cost effective to use single-radio sniffers that periodically sample each of the available channels. At any
given time, there may be trafﬁc on any of the 802.11b/g
channels, and a radio could cycle through these channels,
capturing some trafﬁc on one channel before moving on
to another.
The simplest way to sample the channels would be to
spend an equal amount of time on every channel. If, however, there is no trafﬁc on some channel, it would be
wasteful to spend equal time on that channel. Furthermore, to spend time T /n, where T is total cycle time and
n is number of channels, on channels that have a small
share of trafﬁc may also be wasteful. On the other hand,
for particular applications it might be useful to spend time
on underutilised channels, for instance for detecting rogue
access points that may be “hiding” in lesser-used channels.
Some aspects of wireless monitoring have been studied in the literature (see Section VI). Yeo et al [16] describe an infrastructure for wireless monitoring. The authors identify three challenges of wireless monitoring as
1 In the USA, the FCC only allows the use of channels 1 to 11, and we
only consider those channels in this paper.
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Capacity of each Sniffer, Sniffer Placement and Data Collection. We would like to add Sampling Strategies as another challenge.
In this paper, we describe a sampling method whose
parameters can be adjusted to meet the needs of various applications. This paper is laid out as follows. In
Section II we describe different metrics for evaluating
the performance of a sampling strategy. Section III outlines some applications that require different sampling
strategies. Section IV deﬁnes one speciﬁc strategy, and
some experiments using this strategy are presented in
Section V. Section VI discusses related work, and Section VII lists future extensions to this work.

vulnerable or important trafﬁc (such as VoIP) in relation
to total trafﬁc on some channels. Another sampling strategy could be to remain on a particular channel for as much
time as is required to capture n frames, or to observe m
clients. These techniques may be useful in “characterization” applications.
III. C HANNEL S AMPLING A PPLICATIONS
There are many applications of wireless monitoring
and more speciﬁcally, channel sampling. Monitoring
may be used for enabling security, management, characterization, and deployment of 802.11b/g wireless networks. Different applications may require different sampling strategies; we now discuss some of these.

II. M ETRICS
To determine a sampling strategy, the relative importance of a particular channel in relation to other channels
needs to be quantiﬁed. The importance of a channel may
vary with time and depends on the goals of the applications. This concept is similar to the concept of bandwidth
demand and there are techniques that fairly allocate bandwidth among ﬂows [7]. The importance of a channel may
also be thought of as the “monitoring demand” from that
channel. Since this demand may not be known in advance, we may have to estimate the monitoring demand
on the various channels using historical data.
This “demand” metric may vary from application to application. In the simplest case, the demand may be shared
across all channels, and so an appropriate sampling strategy would be to spend equal time on each channel. In this
case, we are sampling the amount of time spent on each
channel, and using this to determine the amount of time
to be spent on each channel in the next round (although
in this case the intervals are equal). We refer to this as
an Equal/Time/Time sampling strategy. In another example, the metric may be the Frame Count on the channel
(an Equal/Frame Count/Frame Count strategy).
We may also use this metric to determine a sampling
strategy that divides time among the channels in the
same proportion as the observed relative frame counts
on different channels. We refer to this as a Proportional/Time/Frame Count sampling strategy, as we are
using the Frame Count to determine the amount of Time
on each channel. To know the frame count, we must sample the channel ﬁrst (in some simple and fair manner).
As the trafﬁc volumes on various channels will vary with
time, we must periodically update relative frame count
proportions that are used to determine the sampling strategy.
Another metric, also time varying, may be the number of clients on a particular channel (a Proportional/Time/Client Count sampling strategy). Other
metrics include the number of attacks on some channels,
number of legitimate access points, or the proportion of

A. Security
The shared nature of wireless networks introduces
many security risks and potential attacks, such as denial
of service, man-in-the-middle frame injection attacks, or
eavesdropping (see the literature for discussion of several
802.11 attacks [6], [9]). One method for detecting these
attacks is to capture all frames and recognize particular
attack signatures [8]. Another mechanism is to detect the
effect of the attack on the network, such as looking for
clients that obtain unfair bandwidth allocation [12].
These detection methods may beneﬁt from different
kinds of sampling strategies. A signature-based detection
technique that depends on capturing every frame of an
attack may require continuous monitoring of a particular
channel. On the other hand, some attacks, such as those
that require ﬂooding, may still be detected even if a channel is sampled.
Some attackers may wish to attack channels that have
maximum trafﬁc volume, while others may be motivated
to attack channels with high numbers of clients. Sampling
strategies that give higher weight to such channels may be
of particular use.
It is important to note that if an attacker knows the
monitoring system’s sampling strategy, the system is vulnerable to the attacker modifying his or her behavior to
evade observation. For example, if the attacker knows
that the sampling strategy being used is any kind of Proportional/Time Counting sampling strategy, the attacker
may introduce trafﬁc on some channels and attack the remaining channels. To circumvent this attack the sampling
strategy should involve some random behavior.
B. Management
Problems in wireless networks do not result solely from
attacks. There might be RF holes, connectivity problems
or authentication problems that a network administrator
needs to discover as soon as they occur. Adya et al discusses a management infrastructure that depends on wireless monitoring by clients [4]. A smart sampling strategy
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could be used to augment the management techniques described in that paper.
Network managers may wish to monitor the channels
to determine QoS being provided to VoIP calls. The sampling metric could be based on the proportion of VoIP
trafﬁc.
C. Characterization
Characterizing wireless networks is useful for improving wireless protocols, simulating wireless networks, developing new mobile applications and so forth. Accurate
characterization of wireless networks relies on accurate
measurement, and so sampling strategies may prove useful. Sampling can increase the geographic channel coverage of sniffers, and reduce the expense of deploying multiple sniffers, one for each channel.
Enterprise wireless networks are becoming increasingly sophisticated, with access points that can automatically alter their power levels and channels to increase coverage and reduce interference. Characterizing such networks can be difﬁcult with statically-conﬁgured sniffers.
A network measurement infrastructure should adjust dynamically so as to continue to collect relevant data from
the network, and an appropriate sampling strategy might
be one that focuses on APs’ currently-assigned channels.
D. Deployment
Wireless monitoring is useful in the deployment stage
of a wireless network, in the “site survey”, where AP density requirements are determined. But monitoring is also
useful in the post-deployment phase, where sanity checks
may need to be performed. For instance, it may be necessary to determine that the correct number of APs have
been deployed, or that their channel assignment is correct. Channel-sampling sniffers could be useful for this
purpose.
Post-deployment measurement could also be used for
capacity planning, e.g., for noticing hotspots that indicate
a need to deploy additional APs. In such a case a Proportional/Time/Client Count channel strategy might be appropriate.
IV. I MPLEMENTATION OF A SAMPLING STRATEGY
Any sampling strategy needs to be dynamic to meet
the needs of the changing wireless network environment.
There may be situations that require closer monitoring on
some channels than others. For example, after detecting
an attacker on a particular channel, that particular channel
might need to be monitored more closely.
We propose a strategy for determining sampling time
intervals based on Frame Counts, that is, a Proportional/Time/Frame Count sampling strategy. Let n be the
number of channels and T be the time for one complete
sampling cycle, where a cycle is a period of time in which

we visit each channel once. Let f i, j be the number of
frames captured on channel i in the cycle j and ti, j be the
time spent on channel i in cycle j.
Assume that the ﬁrst cycle is an equal-time cycle with
the radio spending ti,1 = T /n time on each channel. At
the end of the ﬁrst cycle, the { f i,1 } contains the number
of frames captured on each channel in the ﬁrst cycle.
The time to be spent on channel i in the next cycle j + 1
is based on the proportions observed during cycle j:
ti, j+1 =

( fi, j /ti, j )
n
∑i=1 ( fi, j /ti, j )

×T

This equation calculates the proportion of frames per
unit time that are captured on channel i in iteration j. That
ratio is multiplied by the total time T so that the time ti, j+1
spent on channel i in the next iteration is in the same proportion.
We call the period that the sniffer spends on one channel an interval. It is important to not allow any channel’s
interval to become too small to capture a frame because
then fi, j = 0 and all future intervals for channel i will be
zero. In our implementation we limit the minimum interval size M. If the proportion allocated to a particular
channel is less than the minimum interval, we spend more
than time T for the next cycle.
The cycle time T is an important feature. If T is short,
correspondingly, the intervals will be small. Each change
in channel introduces some overhead with respect to time.
If intervals are small the channel switching overhead is
signiﬁcant, but the method reacts quickly to changes in
trafﬁc load. If, however, the cycle time is 10sec, the phenomenon might have ended before the correct channel is
sampled again.
Therefore, longer cycle times are useful if efﬁciency
is important for an application. Shorter cycle times are
recommended, however, if quick reactivity is important.
V. E XPERIMENTAL R ESULTS
We have implemented the strategy described above to
validate our hypothesis that through the use of smart sampling strategies we can obtain better data by some measure. The measure or metric is dependent on the application. In this section, we look at two applications. First, we
describe a characterization application in which a higher
number of frames captured is better than a fewer number
of frames. Second, an Intrusion Detection System (IDS)
application where a greater number of intrusion alerts is
better.
A. Characterization experiment
A.1 Testbed
Our testbed consists of two Intel x86 sniffers with
Atheros-based wireless cards. The sniffers ran Linux (Fedora Core 4 with kernel 2.6.14 and the MadWiFi driver)
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for our experiments. The two sniffers were placed 90 cm
apart in a research lab that had a crowded radio environment with several 802.11 experiments in progress at any
given time.
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Fig. 1. Equal/Time/Time sampling strategy (T = 11 sec).

Figure 1 shows the number of frames captured on each
channel using the Equal/Time/Time sampling strategy.
We observe that the Frame Counts varied across channels.
This example is one of 20 runs, all of which were similar
except for one case described below.
Figure 2 shows that the time spent on each channel was
close to being equal. The slight differences in the heights
of the columns are due to a lag between our measurement
and the time the channel was actually changed.
Figure 3 shows the trafﬁc captured using the Proportional/Time/Frame Count sampling strategy. Note that
the peaks (highest frame counts) are higher than in the
case of the Equal/Time/Time sampling strategy because
the more active channels are allocated more time in the
Proportional/Time/Frame Count strategy.
In one of the runs (Figure 5), we observed a huge
spike on channel 8. On further investigation we deter-

mined that the data was HTTP trafﬁc from one speciﬁc
client. Using the Equal/Time/Time sampling strategy,
about 19 megabytes of trafﬁc was captured in the run that
lasted 10 minutes—about twice the volume as in other
runs. Simultaneously, however, the sniffer running the
Proportional/Time/Frame Count sampling strategy (Figure 7) captured nearly 80 megabytes of data. This volume
was approximately 8 times the volume collected by other
runs of the Proportional/Time/Frame Count strategy. This
observation indicates that the Proportional/Time/Frame
Count sampling strategy is indeed successful in maximizing the data capture. The Proportional/Time/Frame Count
sampling strategy captured 6 times as many frames on
channel 8 than the Equal/Time/Time strategy.
Figure 8 shows that the Proportional/Time/Frame
Count sampling strategy adapted the time spent on each
channel to the trafﬁc abnormalities while in contrast the
Equal/Time/Time strategy maintained equal proportions
(Figure 6).
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Fig. 5. Equal/Time/Time strategy: Huge trafﬁc spike on channel 8 (T
= 3.3 sec.) Note that the scale of the Y-axis is different from the
previous plots. Compare this ﬁgure to Figure 7.

B. IDS Experiment
As described in section III-A, one use of sampling is
for detecting security breaches in wireless networks. In
the case of denial-of-service attacks, a malicious attacker
may be motivated to disrupt as much trafﬁc as possible.
To achieve this goal, the attacker will need to monitor
the channels to determine which channel has the highest
load. Once this channel is determined, the attack can be
launched on that channel.
To determine the effectiveness of our system in such a
scenario, we mimicked this attack strategy. We periodically measured the trafﬁc on each channel and launched
an attack on the channel with the highest number of
frames. Each attack was of random length (between 0
and 12 seconds) with intervals of random length (between
5 and 12 seconds) between each attack.
We used a Linux laptop as the attacker’s machine, running the Auditor distribution of Linux. We ran the deauthentication attack ﬁle2air, which spoofs the MAC ad-
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Fig. 7. The Proportional/Time/Frame Count sampling strategy accentuates the spike in trafﬁc volume (T = 3.3sec)

dress of an AP and sends ﬂood of deauthenticaton messages to a victim so as to deny service. We conﬁgured
ﬁle2air to send a ﬂood of deauthentication frames with
interframe intervals of 1 millisecond.
We sampled the 11 802.11b/g channels using the Proportional/Time/Frame Count and the Equal/Time/Time
sampling strategies. To detect the attack, we ran the popular IDS tool snort-wireless [3] on the traces captured using
the two sampling strategies.
We observe that snort-wireless detects a greater number of abnormal sequence number gaps (which indicate
MAC spooﬁng) in the traces collected from the Proportional/Time/Frame Count (Figure 9) strategy than the
Equal/Time/Time sampling strategy.2 Snort-wireless also
generates more alerts (Figure 10) in the ProportionalTime Frame Count trace. This indicates that the Proportional/Time/Frame Count strategy captured more attack
instances than the Equal/Time/Time sampling strategy. A
2 Note that snort-wireless only ﬂags a deauth attack alert on spoofed
deauthentication frames, rather than legitimate deauthentications.
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Fig. 10.
Number of Alerts ﬂagged by snort-wireless. snortwireless consistently ﬂags more alerts in the trace captured using the Proportional/Time/Frame Count sampling strategy than the
Equal/Time/Time strategy
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“war driving” tool, Kismet [1], includes conﬁguration options for channel-hopping sequences and channel-dwell
times (channel intervals). The interval times are conﬁgured statically, however.

60

50

40

30

20

10

VII. C ONCLUSIONS AND F UTURE WORK

0
1

1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9

2

2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9

3

3.1 3.2

Total Cycle time for sampling (seconds)

Fig. 9. Number of abnormal sequence number gaps detected by snortwireless. snort-wireless detects more abnormal sequence number
gaps in the trace captured by the Proportional/Time/Frame Count
sampling strategy than the Equal/Time/Time strategy.

paired t-test indicates that the two strategies perform differently at the 1% level.
Figures 9 and 10 show the outcome of our experiments,
with total cycle times varying from 1.1 seconds to 3.1 seconds, and a minimum interval time of 0.5 seconds in each
run. Although there is no trend over the increasing cycle
times, snort-wireless consistently detects a greater number of abnormal sequence number gaps and ﬂags more
alerts in the the Proportional/Time/Frame Count sampling
strategy than the Equal/Time/Time strategy. Our expectation that more attacks would be detected using smart sampling was therefore correct.
VI. R ELATED W ORK
We mention above some of the many wireless network
characterization studies [5], [15], [10] that use wiredside methods to monitor wireless networks. Wirelessside characterization studies are less common, and are

In this paper we have discussed the motivation for
smart channel-sampling strategies, and experimented
with a Proportional/Time/Frame Count sampling strategy
that spends more time on channels with higher observed
frame rates.
The ideas presented in this paper are still at a preliminary stage. There are many sampling strategies that remain to be explored. In the near term, we intend to integrate the channel sampling system into a monitoring system for an infrastructure wireless network. We plan to implement more sampling strategies and explore their usefulness. We are also considering active sampling strategies that dynamically alter their parameters (such as cycle
time) depending on the observed trafﬁc, and introducing
randomization in channel-hopping sequences and intervals in order to detect an elusive attacker hiding in lesser
utilized channels.
A property of 802.11 networks we intend to exploit is
cross-channel interference. Due to channel overlap, even
if a radio is on a particular channel, signals from adjacent
channels can be observed [13]. Sampling can be optimized by using these leakage signals from other channels.
Ideally, we will not need to hop to some channels nearly
as often.
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